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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 11-1972 
 ___________ 
 
 JAMES FREEMAN, 
        Appellant 
 
 v. 
 
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS; SUPERINTENDENT JOSEPH J. PIAZZA; LT. 
JORDAN; LT. MOYER; OFFICER STUDLACK; OFFICER BOWERS; OFFICER 
FORNWALD; OFFICER LAHR; LISA SHAY KERNS-BARR; MS. McCATHY, 
MEDICAL ADMINISTRATOR; ANN M. BATDORF; KYLE CONFER 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. Civil No. 07-2191) 
 District Judge:  Honorable James M. Munley 
 ____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
October 3, 2011 
Before:  JORDAN, BARRY and GARTH, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed: October 6, 2011) 
 _________ 
 
 OPINION 
 _________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Pro se appellant James Freeman appeals the District Court’s orders granting 
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summary judgment to the defendants and denying his cross-motion for summary 
judgment.  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and exercise a plenary standard 
of review.  State Auto Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Pro Design, P.C., 566 F.3d 86, 89 (3d Cir. 
2009).  For the reasons set forth below, we will affirm. 
 Freeman, a state prisoner, has sued numerous prison employees under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983.  Freeman alleges that the defendants (who will be treated collectively in this 
opinion) violated his constitutional rights by (1) denying his prison grievances, (2) 
finding him guilty during prison disciplinary proceedings, (3) confiscating his Uniform 
Commercial Code (UCC) materials, (4) retaliating against him for filing grievances, (5) 
destroying his property, (6) using excessive force against him, and (7) providing him 
inadequate medical care.  The District Court granted summary judgment to the 
defendants, and Freeman filed a timely notice of appeal to this Court.
 
 
 We agree with the District Court’s analysis of Freeman’s claims.  As an initial 
matter, the Eleventh Amendment bars suits for monetary damages against state officials 
sued in their official capacities.  See Melo v. Hafer, 912 F.2d 628, 635 (3d Cir. 1990).  
Therefore, Freeman’s claims that seek money damages from the defendants in their 
official capacities fail as a matter of law.   
 The District Court was likewise correct to reject Freeman’s claim concerning the 
prison grievance system.  Prisoners do not have a constitutional right to prison grievance 
procedures.  See, e.g., Massey v. Helman, 259 F.3d 641, 647 (7th Cir. 2001) (collecting 
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cases).  Thus, the defendants’ alleged obstruction or misapplication of these procedures is 
not independently actionable.  
 We will further affirm the District Court’s grant of summary judgment to the 
defendants on Freeman’s claim that his First Amendment rights were violated by the 
defendants’ confiscation of his UCC materials.  We have previously held that the 
Department of Corrections’ policy permitting confiscation of these types of materials is 
not constitutionally unreasonable because it advances an interest in preventing prisoners 
from filing fraudulent liens.  Monroe v. Beard, 536 F.3d 198, 207-10 (3d Cir. 2008).  
Freeman has failed to distinguish our holding in Monroe on a legal or factual basis; 
accordingly, Monroe is dispositive of Freeman’s First Amendment claim. 
 We also agree with the District Court’s resolution of Freeman’s claim that the 
defendants involved in his two disciplinary actions violated his right to procedural due 
process.  The protections of the Due Process Clause are triggered only if there is a 
deprivation of a protected interest in life, liberty, or property.  See Mitchell v. Horn, 318 
F.3d 523, 531 (3d Cir. 2003).  “For a prisoner, such a deprivation occurs when the prison 
imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary 
incidents of prison life.”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  Freeman claimed that, 
as a result of the disciplinary proceedings, he was sanctioned to a total of 360 days of 
disciplinary custody.  This alleged punishment does not constitute an atypical and 
significant hardship in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life, and Freeman’s 
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claim therefore fails.  See Griffin v. Vaughn, 112 F.3d 703, 708 (3d Cir. 1997).   
 We will similarly affirm the District Court’s order as to Freeman’s retaliation 
claim.  Freeman contends that, in retaliation for his filing a grievance against a prison 
guard, that guard searched his cell, confiscated his UCC materials, and placed him in the 
restrictive housing unit.  To establish a claim of retaliation under the First Amendment, 
Freeman must show that (1) the conduct in which he was engaged was constitutionally 
protected; (2) he suffered adverse action at the hands of prison officials; and (3) his 
constitutionally protected conduct was a substantial or motivating factor in the decision to 
take the adverse action.  Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333-34 (3d Cir. 2001).  If 
Freeman makes this initial showing, the defendants “may still prevail by proving that 
they would have made the same decision absent the protected conduct for reasons 
reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest.”  Id. at 334.  Here, Freeman 
admitted to violating prison rules by possessing UCC materials.  Therefore, even 
assuming that Freeman made out a prima facie case, there is no genuine issue of material 
fact that the prison guard’s conduct was reasonably related to legitimate penological 
interests and that Freeman would have been disciplined for his offense notwithstanding 
his grievance.  See Carter v. McGrady, 292 F.3d 152, 159 (3d Cir. 2002).  Accordingly, 
as the District Court held, the defendants were entitled to summary judgment on this 
claim.   
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 We will also affirm the District Court’s order granting judgment to the defendants 
on Freeman’s claim that the defendants violated his due process rights by confiscating 
and destroying his property.  Deprivation of inmate property by prison officials does not 
state a cognizable due process claim if the prisoner has an adequate post-deprivation state 
remedy.  See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984).  An adequate remedy was 
available here:  Freeman could have filed a state tort action, see id. at 535.   
 We will also affirm the District Court’s disposition of Freeman’s excessive-force 
claim.  The Eighth Amendment prohibits prison officials from unnecessarily and 
wantonly inflicting pain in a manner that offends contemporary standards of decency.  
See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992).  When reviewing Eighth Amendment 
excessive-force claims, we must determine whether the “force was applied in a good-
faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause 
harm.”  Id. at 7.  In making this determination, we examine the factors outlined by the 
Supreme Court in Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 321 (1986), including (1) the need for 
the application of force; (2) the relationship between the need and the amount of force 
that was used; (3) the extent of injury inflicted; (4) the extent of the threat to the safety of 
staff and inmates, as reasonably perceived by responsible officials on the basis of the 
facts known to them; and (5) any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful 
response. 
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 Here, Freeman alleged that two prison guards, after locking him in his cell and 
removing his handcuffs, yanked on his arm, twisted his finger, and closed a wicket door 
several times on his arm.  However, as the District Court emphasized, Freeman played a 
key role in the scuffle with the guards.  He admitted that he tried to throw the first guard 
off track, which prompted the guards to apply force against him and attempt to re-cuff his 
hands.  Eventually, by tussling with the guards, Freeman was able to gain possession of 
the handcuffs.  Inmates are not permitted to possess handcuffs because they can be used 
as a weapon, and accordingly, the guards then took further action to reclaim the 
handcuffs.  Thus, it was reasonable for the defendants to use force to retrieve the 
handcuffs and to subdue Freeman, and they properly discontinued their use of force once 
they had accomplished these goals.  Further, Freeman sustained only minor injuries — 
some abrasions on his arms — in the incident.  While the absence of serious injury is not 
dispositive, it does indicate that the force the guards used was itself limited.  See Wilkins 
v. Gaddy, 130 S. Ct. 1175, 1178 (2010).  In these circumstances, therefore, we conclude 
that the force the defendants used was reasonable as a matter of law.  
 Finally, we conclude that the District Court did not err in granting summary 
judgment to the defendants on Freeman’s claim that the defendants provided him 
inadequate medical care after he was injured in the above-described altercation with the 
guards.  To make out an Eighth Amendment claim, Freeman must establish that the 
defendants acted with deliberate indifference; that is, that they “kn[ew] of and 
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disregard[ed] an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.”  Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 
825, 837 (1994).  The undisputed evidence shows that medical personnel visited and 
examined Freeman soon after he was injured and advised him to keep his abrasions clean, 
and that a nurse later followed up, took x-rays of Freeman’s hand, and prescribed a 
cream.  While Freeman believes that this care was insufficient, we have recognized that 
courts will “disavow any attempt to second-guess the propriety or adequacy of a 
particular course of treatment[,] which remains a question of sound professional 
judgment.”  Inmates of Allegheny Cnty. Jail v. Pierce, 612 F.2d 754, 762 (3d Cir. 1979) 
(internal alterations, quotation marks omitted)).  Therefore, as the District Court held, the 
defendants were also entitled to judgment on this claim.   
 Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s orders.1 
                                                 
1
 For the reasons discussed in this opinion, we conclude that the District Court also 
correctly denied Freeman’s cross-motion for summary judgment. 
